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Introduction
What explains variation in the salience of anti-elite rhetoric 
and reducing political corruption for parties across Europe? 
These questions have been significant to the party systems 
of central and eastern Europe since their transitions from 
communism (Engler, 2016; Hanley and Sikk, 2016; 
Vachudova, 2009), but corruption has also been a persistent 
problem in southern Europe (Charron et al., 2014; Putnam 
et al., 1994). The rise of the 5 Star Movement in Italy, 
Syriza in Greece, and Podemos in Spain illustrates the con-
temporary relevance of anti-elite rhetoric and political 
competition surrounding corruption. Politicizing corrup-
tion can be electorally advantageous for certain types of 
parties (Bågenholm and Charron, 2014; Hanley and Sikk, 
2016), and anti-elite/establishment rhetoric is a key feature 
of populist (Mudde, 2004) and challenger parties (Hobolt 
and De Vries, 2015). Most recently, the “Brexit” vote in the 
United Kingdom makes apparent the significance of anti-
elite/establishment rhetoric for European politics.
In this article we examine these issues via two new items 
in the 2014 wave of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). 
In the process, we also introduce this most recent round of 
the longest-running expert survey on party positioning in 
European democracies, and cross-validate the CHES data 
with party positions derived from party manifestos and 
country-level information on political corruption. We show 
two things: political corruption is much more salient among 
parties from countries with poor quality of government 
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(QoG), whereas anti-elite salience is more a function of 
ideology. Extreme leftist and extreme socially conservative 
parties are most likely to oppose political elites, while the 
national origin of a party is largely irrelevant. Taken 
together, this provides an important contribution to our 
understanding of party competition. Although it may 
first appear intuitive that the anti-corruption and anti-
establishment foci of political parties would be two sides of 
the same coin, in fact these have different causal logics. 
The first depends largely on the corruption problems that 
confront a society. The latter arises in conjunction with the 
ideological moorings of a party.
Similarities and differences in 
the salience of anti-elite and anti-
corruption party appeals
Recent years have witnessed the electoral rise of anti-estab-
lishment movements and political parties (Hanley and Sikk, 
2016; Hobolt and De Vries, 2015). These challengers tend 
to rely on anti-elite rhetoric, pointing out the supposed dis-
tance, lack of understanding, and political corruption of 
political leaders (Pop-Eleches, 2010), who—these oppo-
nents contend—are aloof from both the needs and interests, 
as well as the mores, of “ordinary citizens.” European polit-
ical arenas thus currently face calls for political renewal 
that combine anti-elite and anti-corruption voices. Political 
parties on the ideological extremes should thus be more 
likely to rhetorically emphasize the shortcomings of the 
political system, be it by pointing out the aloofness of its 
political elite or by pointing out its corrupt character (Jagers 
and Walgrave, 2007; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011). Both 
orientations are features of populism, a thin ideology most 
readily found in parties of the radical right and radical left 
(Mudde, 2004, p. 549; Rooduijn et al., 2014, p. 564).
Research suggests that other features of political parties 
will enhance the salience of both anti-elite and anti-corrup-
tion rhetoric. Recently created political parties can present 
themselves as clean and untainted in comparison with 
established political actors. Similarly, it is easier for parties 
in opposition to blame parties in government for the prob-
lem of political corruption; this is particularly true for chal-
lenger parties (Hobolt and De Vries, 2015) that have not yet 
participated in government. In line with Bågenholm and 
Charron (2014) we expect that the salience of anti-estab-
lishment and anti-corruption rhetoric will be greater for 
new parties than for older established competitors, and 
greater for parties in opposition than for those in 
government.
Canonical studies of the radical right highlight the fusing 
of anti-corruption with anti-elite rhetoric (see e.g. Kitschelt 
and McGann, 1995, Chapter 5) and anti-establishment par-
ties frequently break through in high corruption environ-
ments (Hanley and Sikk, 2016), but anti-elite and 
anti-corruption rhetorics function according to somewhat 
divergent logics. Although populist messages often stress 
the corruption of elected officials (Abts and Rummens, 
2007, p. 408), an emphasis on reducing political corruption 
does not necessarily make a party populist. We go on to 
show that while the salience of anti-elite rhetoric is closely 
associated with (extreme) ideological views of political par-
ties, anti-corruption salience mostly occurs in political sys-
tems plagued by higher rates of political corruption.
When evaluating the effect of ideological extremism 
on anti-elite rhetoric, we differentiate between economic 
left-right and placement on the socio-cultural (GAL-TAN) 
dimension, which spans from social liberalism to social 
conservatism. Left-wing populism tends to stress economic 
issues (March, 2007), whereas right-wing populist parties 
tend to be extreme in their authoritarianism and national-
ism (Mudde, 2007). Both extremes, the economic left and 
the cultural right, should be more inclined to criticize the 
political establishment in much the same way as they have 
opposed European integration (Hooghe et al., 2002; Otjes 
and Louwerse, 2015).
Hypothesis 1: Parties of either the economic left or the 
socio-cultural right will be more likely to emphasize 
anti-elite, anti-establishment rhetoric.
The salience of reducing political corruption differs across 
the regions of Europe (Engler, 2016; Hanley and Sikk, 
2016). While southern and eastern European countries are 
regarded as having widespread corruption at the highest 
levels of government (see Wachs, 2014), the prevalence of 
corruption is considerably lower in the west and the north 
of the continent (Charron et al., 2014). Following these 
authors, we anticipate that high levels of corruption in a 
country will generate a demand for anti-corruption policies 
among voters and that parties in these systems will be more 
likely to pick up on this demand (Bågenholm and Charron, 
2014, p. 909).
Hypothesis 2: Parties in countries with high levels of 
political corruption will be more likely to stress the 
importance of reducing political corruption.
The next section moves on to describe the data with which 
we test these expectations.
The 2014 CHES
Administered in 2014 to 337 political scientists specializ-
ing in political parties and European integration, the 2014 
CHES, available at chesdata.eu, provides information about 
the positioning of 268 parties on political ideology, 
European integration, and various policy areas.1 The survey 
covers political parties in 31 countries, including all 
European Union member states, plus Norway, Switzerland 
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and Turkey.2 The 2014 survey has been combined with 
prior waves to produce a trend file with five time points 
from 1999 to 2014, making the CHES the longest-running, 
most extensive expert survey on political parties in Europe.
Prior waves of the CHES data have been cross-validated 
with a variety of alternative sources of party positioning 
information (Bakker et al., 2015; Hooghe et al., 2010; 
Marks et al., 2007; Steenbergen and Marks, 2007). These 
show a high level of correlation, particularly with place-
ments derived from aggregate voter placements, a finding 
consistent with other research (Dalton and McAllister, 
2015; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012).3
For the first time, the 2014 CHES included questions 
about the “salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhet-
oric” and the “salience of reducing political corruption” for 
the political parties of Europe. All experts were asked to 
provide salience scores for all parties in a given party sys-
tem on these two questions; responses could range from 0 
(not at all important) to 10 (very important).
Figure 1 displays the party-based salience of reducing 
political corruption aggregated to the country level. It shows 
that political corruption is a more salient issue in southern 
and eastern Europe, but considerably less salient in northern 
and western Europe. Turning to cross-validation for the 
CHES salience of reducing political corruption variable, 
the Manifesto Project Dataset includes party-level data on 
the percentage of quasi-statements in a party’s manifesto 
devoted to political corruption (per304). Specifically, the 
category refers to the “Need to eliminate political corruption 
and associated abuses of political and/or bureaucratic 
power” (Volkens et al., 2016). This variable correlates with 
the CHES salience of reducing political corruption variable 
at r = 0.47, which is a relatively strong correlation given that 
many parties have 0s in the manifesto data, meaning that no 
quasi-statements in the manifesto pertained to reducing 
political corruption.4
Figure 2 shows variation in the salience of anti- 
establishment and anti-elite rhetoric across the party 
families of Europe. Consistent with our expectations, 
we see that this type of rhetoric is much more important 
to the parties of the extreme left and extreme right than 
the more centrist party families. Cross-validation exer-
cises for this new CHES salience variable are more dif-
ficult because of data limitations. To our knowledge, 
there are no existing party-level measures of anti-estab-
lishment and anti-elite rhetoric salience. But as men-
tioned above, anti-elite and anti-establishment positions 
are a core feature of populism, and we therefore validate 
our measure of the salience of anti-elite sentiments with 
a method (Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011) that uses a dic-
tionary of populist words to identify the degree of pop-
ulism in the election manifestos of parties. Rooduijn 
and Pauwels (2011) developed language-specific dic-
tionaries for the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and the 
Figure 1. Country-level variation in corruption salience, unweighted by party vote share. (Source: CHES 2014).
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United Kingdom and we used them to identify the 
degree of populism in recent election manifestos. The 
two measures correlate reasonably well (r = 0.51). The 
main outliers are the Italian parties Democratic Party 
(PD), The Five Star Movement (M5S) and Lega Nord 
(LN). Remarkably, the text analysis method categorizes 
the latter two as much less populist than the PD. The 
placements of these three parties by experts seem to 
have more face validity. Without these three outliers the 
correlation between the two variables is r = 0.75.
As an additional check on the face validity of the anti-
establishment/anti-elite question, Figure 3 depicts the corre-
lation between a party’s position on European integration 
and the salience it places on anti-elite and anti-establishment 
rhetoric. As one would expect, these variables correlate 
rather highly with one another (r = −0.70) and show that par-
ties that oppose European integration generally emphasize 
anti-elite/anti-establishment rhetoric whereas pro-EU parties 
are much less likely to use this type of rhetoric.
In the next section, we present a more detailed examina-
tion of variation in the salience of reducing political corrup-
tion and anti-elite/anti-establishment for political parties 
across European countries.
Anti-elite and anti-corruption salience 
for political parties across Europe
We model anti-elite and anti-corruption salience as a function 
of a set of party and country-level predictors: first, we model 
the effect of economic (left-right) and social (GAL-TAN) 
placement of political parties, and add their quadratic terms 
given our expectation that extreme parties emphasize anti-
elite and anti-corruption topics.5 Variable age measures the 
number of years a party has existed since 1945 in western 
Europe, and since 1990 in eastern Europe (Döring and Regel, 
2016). Since an age effect is likely to be non-linear, we also 
include a squared term for age. The variable In_government is 
a dummy variable scored 1 for parties that were in govern-
ment in 2014. We weight each party (observation) by its vote 
share in the most recent national elections to reflect the fact 
that larger parties tend to be more significant actors in party 
systems. At the country-level, we use the PRS Group’s 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) country-level indi-
cator of QoG. This variable is the mean value of the ICRG 
variables measuring corruption, law and order, and bureau-
cratic quality, and was taken from the QoG Institute’s Basic 
Dataset (Dahlberg et al., 2016).6 The variable ranges from 0 
to 1 with higher values indicating higher QoG. The terms u j  
and eij  represent the country- and party-level random com-
ponents respectively. Given the multi-level nature of our data, 
we specify a random intercept multi-level model as follows
salience econij = +β β
β β
0 1 * _ left_right
econ left right_ _
ij
ij+ * +2
2
3 4
2
6 7 8
2
9
* + *
+ * + * + Age + *
galtan galtan
New Age In_
ij ij
ij ij ij
β
β β β β government
+ Quality of government +u +e_ _
ij
j j ijβ10*
Figure 2. Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric, by party family. (Source: CHES 2014).
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We summarize the results in Figures 4 and 5 and provide 
details in Table 1. As expected, anti-corruption salience is 
strongly influenced by a party’s country-specific level of 
QoG, and to a lesser extent by its ideology. As Figure 4 
demonstrates, countries with lower QoG tend to have par-
ties that emphasize anti-corruption topics. Turning to ideol-
ogy, we see weak support for a curvilinear relationship 
between ideology and anti-corruption salience. While the 
effect of economic left-right is not statistically significant, 
the effect of socio-cultural preferences is statistically sig-
nificant, but substantively weak. Finally, the model pro-
vides significant evidence that more recent parties and 
parties outside government emphasize anti-corruption 
issues more than their more established competitors and 
government parties.
The analysis of anti-elite salience presents a number of 
notable findings. First, Figure 5 shows no significant effect 
of QoG. Second, the figure demonstrates that variance in 
anti-elite salience is largely a function of party ideology. 
While extreme parties tend to emphasize their opposition to 
political elites, the figure demonstrates that the salience is 
significantly greater for radical left and TAN parties. Note 
also that the effect of economic and GAL-TAN placement 
on anti-elite salience is substantively much stronger than it 
is for anti-corruption salience. The finding that anti-elite 
parties are primarily located on the TAN side of the GAL-
TAN dimension and on the left side of the economic left-
right dimension is consistent with prior research on 
opposition to European integration (e.g. Hooghe and 
Marks, 2009; Kriesi, 2007). Hence, emphasizing opposi-
tion to elites brings together two groups of parties—the 
extreme left and the extreme TAN—that generally position 
themselves quite far from one another on many other issues, 
at least in western Europe (see Rovny, 2014, for details on 
eastern Europe). This shared ambivalence if not outright 
opposition to European integration from the economic left 
and extreme TAN parties is illustrated in the current gov-
erning coalition in Greece between the leftist Syriza and 
nationalist ANEL. Finally, the figure also supports the 
expectation that recently created parties and parties outside 
government place greater emphasis on opposing political 
elites than do established and governing parties.
In sum, we find that anti-corruption salience is best 
explained by the presence of corruption—which clusters 
geographically—party age and government status. Political 
parties from countries with lower QoG pay much more 
attention to political corruption. Similarly, recent parties 
and parties outside government emphasize anti-corruption 
issues more than established and governing parties. The 
effect of political ideology is insignificant or small. Anti-
elite salience, by contrast, is primarily a function of ideol-
ogy, party age and government status. Extreme leftist and 
extreme TAN parties are most likely to oppose political 
elites, while their national origin is largely irrelevant. This 
finding is particularly interesting given the evidence that 
anti-establishment reform parties with moderate social and 
Figure 3. Correlation of EU position and salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric. (Source: CHES 2014).
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Figure 5. Predicting anti-elite salience with ideological placement. Predicted values with 95% confidence intervals. (Source: CHES 
2014).
Figure 4. Predicting anti-corruption salience with ideological placement. Predicted values with 95% confidence intervals. (Source: 
CHES 2014).
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economic policies have found recent success in eastern 
Europe (Hanley and Sikk, 2016), which is a tension that 
should be examined in future research. As with anti-corrup-
tion salience, recent parties and parties outside government 
tend to emphasize anti-elite rhetoric more than established 
and governing parties, and it could be productive to exam-
ine variation in the extent of parties’ previous governing 
experience as an extension of this finding.
Discussion
Anti-elite/establishment rhetoric and the reduction of polit-
ical corruption have emerged as critical features of contem-
porary European politics. These issues have long been a 
central aspect of post-communist European party competi-
tion and are increasingly prominent in southern European 
countries as well. Understanding the salience of political 
corruption for parties in southern and eastern Europe is 
important, not only because of the profound and debilitat-
ing impact of corruption on the capacity of states and on the 
welfare of citizens (Halleröd et al., 2013; Holmberg and 
Rothstein, 2011), but also because anti-corruption and anti-
elite appeals have transformed the nature of political 
competition and displaced traditional socio-economic 
appeals (see e.g. Pop-Eleches, 2010).
The politics of anti-elitism is also of growing impor-
tance in northern Europe, where political corruption is not 
as salient. In particular, northern Eurosceptic parties like 
UKIP (anti-establishment salience score of 9.3 on the 0–10 
scale) in the UK deploy anti-elite messaging in an attempt 
to decouple national polities from the European Union and 
other forms of transnational cooperation. The recent refer-
endum on EU membership in the UK makes abundantly 
clear the impact that this form of party competition can 
have on modern European politics (Hobolt, 2016).
This paper has shown that party-based, anti-elite sali-
ence is closely related to ideology, but that the salience of 
political corruption for parties is more closely tied to 
national context. These results hold in the 2014 CHES data 
together with—and controlling for—the more general find-
ing that newer and opposition parties tend to emphasize 
both issues more than older parties, consistent with previ-
ous research. These new questions included in 2014 supple-
ment core items in the CHES that have now been collected 
over five time points, making the dataset an increasingly 
useful source of information for dynamic analysis of party 
positioning across Europe.
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Notes
1. An EU Candidate Survey is also available as a separate data-
set. This survey was administered at the same time (allowing 
comparisons among candidates but also between members 
and candidates).
2. In one of the first published expert surveys on party position-
ing, Huber and Inglehart (1995) aimed for at least five com-
pleted surveys per country. Users should note that there were 
fewer than five completed surveys for Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Malta and Norway in the 2014 CHES data.
3. Furthermore, Bakker et al. (2014) demonstrate the cross-
national comparability of expert assessments.
4. Bågenholm and Charron (2014) also produce a party-
based measure of corruption salience, but this variable is 
Table 1. Multi-level model results.
(1) (2)
 Corruption Anti-elite
Level 1 fixed effects  
Economic left-right 0 .058 −0.895**
 (0.290) (0.356)
Economic left-right2 −0.004 0.048
 (0.027) (0.034)
Galtan −0.929*** −0.799***
 (0.303) (0.291)
Galtan2 0.077*** 0.111***
 (0.027) (0.027)
Age −0.106*** −0.131***
 (0.026) (0.032)
Age2 0.001*** 0.001***
 (0.000) (0.000)
In government −0.882*** −1.621***
 (0.310) (0.265)
Level 2 fixed effects  
Quality of government −5.472*** 1.997
 (1.324) (1.230)
Random effects  
Constant 13.248*** 9.319***
 (1.141) (1.240)
σu 0.773 0.703
 (0.097) (0.086)
Observations 197 197
Number of groups 23 23
Standard errors in parentheses *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
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dichotomous and ends several years before 2014, making it 
less suitable for comparison with our measure.
5. The correlation between the economic left-right and GAL-
TAN positions of the parties in this analysis is (r = −0.40).
The Dansk Folkparti (DF) and French Front National (FN)
illustrate that these positions are often quite independent of
one another. The economic left-right position of these parties
is centrist (4.5 for DF) or center-right (5.9 for FN), but both
are extreme in their cultural conservatism: 8.4 for DF and 8.9 
for FN. Furthermore, note that the squared term is used to
test curvilinear relationships.
6. The QoG institute collects data related to the QoG institutions. 
These data are widely used in corruption research and have
been recognized with a dataset award from the American
Political Science Association (APSA) Comparative Politics
Section in 2009.
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